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Commercial firms are increasingly tying the sales of their products with donations
to a charitable cause. Apart from a charitable motive, offering these charity-linked
bundles could be a strategic instrument for firms to increase profits. We report the
results of an experiment that investigates for different of these schemes whether they
are able to increase profits net of the donation, and which donation scheme is most
profitable. From a theoretical perspective, given rational agents, complete markets,
and absent transaction cost, selling charity-linked bundles should not be profitable
even when consumers are altruistic. We find however that sellers who donate 5% of
their gross revenues or an equivalent absolute amount do attain significantly higher
profits. No such effect is observed when the donation is limited to 2%. Offering
charity-linked bundles considerably crowds out private donations by buyers.
JEL classification: D4, L2, L31.
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Research on charitable giving has been focused on identifying the different motives for
people to donate to charitable causes and on how charities could use these insights in
designing optimal fund raising schemes. Less attention has been paid to the question
whether and how commercial firms may benefit from tying the sale of their products with
donations to charity. This despite the fact that many firms have introduced these schemes.
ING bank has for example introduced the “savings account for UNICEF”, committing
themselves to annually donate 0.1 percent of accumulated savings to UNICEF.
Firms differ in their disclosure of how much of each sale is donated to charity and
whether a fixed amount is donated for each sales transaction or a percentage of the sales
revenue. Whereas ING’s donation is a percentage, SurveyMonkey instead donates $0.50
for each completed survey, IKEA donates e 1 for every soft toy or children’s book sold
in participating IKEA stores around Christmas, and Prime Five Homes does not specify
the portion of sales revenue that goes to its non-profits arm.1 Do these efforts originate
purely out of altruistic motives or do they partly result from a firm’s commercial gift for
charity, i.e. a talent to use charitable causes as a strategic tool to increase profits?
This paper reports the results of a lab experiment that investigates exactly this: which
of the schemes above, if any, is able to increase firm profits net of the contribution to
charity? Given consumer rationality, complete markets and absent transaction cost, the
theoretical prediction is clear-cut: none of these schemes is expected to raise profits.
Consumers may be willing to tick up their payment when this benefits charity, but this
increment never exceeds the transfer the seller has to make to the charity. Section 2
formally shows this. We however hypothesize that in practice, firms may benefit from
these schemes for the following reason. Consumers may be myopic in the sense that they
overestimate small percentages, that is, they perceive the fraction of their payment that
benefits charity to be larger than it actually is. This effect is akin to the overweighing of





Our experimental market design is a game where matched pairs of one buyer and two
sellers (one subject-seller and one computer-seller) repeatedly interact. In each period, the
buyer has unit demand and his valuation for the private good is common knowledge. In
supplying the private good, both sellers face a given marginal unit cost which is unknown
to the buyer. In the treatment conditions the subject-seller has to donate to charity
whereas the computer-seller does not. A profit-maximizing firm will simply take the
donation as an additional cost such that this situation is akin to Bertrand competition
with asymmetric cost. The subject-seller (henceforth seller) sets his price, after which
the buyer decides whether to buy or not. If the buyer does not buy from the seller, the
seller earns zero profits. The buyer earns the difference between her fixed endowment
and the price paid to the selected seller. Note that for any price set above marginal
cost, the buyer’s payoff is maximal when she buys from the computer-seller.3 Next to
the transaction decision, the buyer is able to make a private donation decision in each
period. This design feature serves two purposes. First, by offering an alternative way
for altruistic buyers to donate to the same charity at low transaction cost, we ensure
that buyers are not willing to pay a premium for the ‘one stop shop’-service offered by
the subject-seller. Absent such an alternative, altruistic buyers may prefer buying the
bundle at the premium to making an separate donation after the experiment. This would
increase a seller’s net profits. As we wish to prevent this mechanism from driving the
results, we shut down this channel by offering buyers the opportunity to make a separate
donation in each period.4 In this way, our experimental design gives the theoretical
prediction its best shot. Second, a between-treatment comparison of average private
donations allows us to test to which extent the offering of bundles by firms crowds out
private donations (Andreoni, 1993). Research on the optimal fund-raisers scheme for
2Greene (1963); Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Barberis (2013).
3Another reason of introducing an automated computer-seller instead of a second subject-seller that
offers the unbundled private good is that Boone et al. (2012), in a comparison of their results with Dugar
and Mitra (2011), suggest that a design with fixed-roles may lead to the result that the low-cost firm (in
our case the seller that does not donate to charity) will set a price higher than the rival’s marginal cost.
We wish to give the Nash equilibrium prediction its best shot and prevent possible biases towards finding
supracompetitive prices.
4Note that in the lab, the opportunity cost of time spent making a private donation is small because
subjects cannot leave before the end of the session.
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charities has identified that government grants to private charitable organizations crowd
out individual donations (Andreoni, 2011). In investigating whether the crowding out
effect of charity-linked products on private donations is similar to that of government
grants, we hope to contribute to this research on the determinants of crowding out.5
Our experimental design consists of one control and three treatment conditions. In our
control condition (Control), the seller supplies only the private good. In the treatment
conditions the seller is forced to offer the private product in combination with a donation
to charity. By comparing the control and the treatment conditions, we can trace out the
effect of bundling the private good with a donation to charity. The treatment conditions
differ in how much of each sale will be donated to charity and whether this amount is
a fixed part of the sales revenue or a percentage. In treatments Asym-2 and Asym-
5, the donation to charity will be a percentage of revenues, either 2 or 5 percent. In
case overweighing of small percentages plays an important role, we expect that smaller
percentages will result in relatively higher profits to the seller.6 In treatment Asym-Abs,
the seller will donate an absolute amount per unit sold to the charity. If the donation
is an absolute amount, there is less reason to suspect a biased assessment of the actual
donation. Hence, compared to treatments Asym-2 and Asym-5, this treatment should
yield lower average prices and profits to the seller if overestimation of the part donated
via the bundle is expected.
We are not the first to study the question whether bundling a private good with a
charitable cause leads to an increased willingness to pay. Using data from eBay, Elfen-
bein and McManus (2010) find that the winning bids for otherwise identical goods are
6% higher when linked to a charity. Despite this premium, the increase is however not
sufficient to increase seller profit. We hypothesize that this is because in their case the
share of revenues donated to charity is too high to profitably benefit from any consumer
bias: at least 10 percent of revenues in all transactions is donated to charity, and in 60
percent of the observed cases it is the full 100 percent of revenues. Dube´ et al. (2015)
5See also Imas (2014).
6We use “Asym” as a shorthand to describe these treatments because only subject-sellers bundle their
good with a donation, resulting in an asymmetry in their profit functions. In Control, neither the
human or the computer sells a charity-linked bundle.
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set up a field experiment in cause marketing. They focus on consumers’ behavioral re-
sponses to different combinations of discounts on the consumption good and donations
to the charitable cause. They find that for large discounts, larger donations may cre-
ate non-monotonicities in demand. Dube´ et al. (2015) attribute this to price discounts
crowding out consumer self-perception of altruism. They do not address how different
combinations affect net firm benefits because they lack information on the specific cost
structure of their corporate partner. In addressing the question whether charity-linked
bundles is profit-increasing in a competitive market exchange, our research also adds to
the literature on the compatibility of markets and social concerns (Henrich et al., 2010;
Falk and Szech, 2013). Whereas charity-linked bundles can be considered consumption
goods with a positive externality, Bartling et al. (2015) report robust experimental results
showing that buyers are willing to pay a price premium for products that avoid negative
externalities for third parties not part of the transaction.
The experimental study most related to ours is Frackenpohl and Po¨nitzsch (2013)
who also address the question whether bundling the sale of a consumption good with a
contribution to charity leads to an increased willingness to pay for the consumption good,
which they call “superadditivity”. They find strong evidence of this in an experiment
where subjects face multiple choice situations between buying a consumption good (a
mug), a bundle of the same consumption good with a donation of e 2 to a charity, or
buying nothing. They suggest but to do not test that this type of bundling may enable
commercial firms to increase their profits. Our research can be seen as a complement to
their work in the sense that we explicitly aim to identify the potential of bundling as a
strategic device to increase profits. Also, we vary the way the charity is bundled with
the private good – an absolute amount or a percentage – whereas in the experiments by
Frackenpohl and Po¨nitzsch, the donation always is a fixed sum.
Our experimental results indicate that offering bundles is profitable. If we focus on
those cases where sellers set a price above the break-even point, we find that positive
profits are attained in all treatments. Compared to offering the product without the
donation to charity (average net profits of 0.58 ECU), donating five percent of revenues
to charity increases net profits significantly by 0.75 ECU, while donating two percent does
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not lead to higher profits. Donating a fixed amount is just as profitable as donating 5
percent: a donation of 0.43 ECU increases net profits significantly by 0.86 ECU relative to
the control condition. This is surprising given our theoretical prediction that net profits
could result from the overestimation of small percentages; it is less surprising when one
notes that the equivalent amount of 5 percent of revenues is 0.43 ECU. In their study,
Bartling et al. (2015) find that the average price premium is about half of the additional
cost of providing the fair product such that profits of sellers who decide to offer the
fair product are lower than the profits of those offering the unfair product.7 One likely
reason for the difference in findings is that they implemented a different, less competitive,
market structure that givers sellers of the unfair product better opportunities to earn
positive profits.8
It thus seems that offering charity-linked bundles can serve as a strategic instrument
for firms to increase profits, but does this lead to the crowding out of private donations of
buyers? On the subject level, we find evidence of crowding out: in periods where subjects
buy the bundle, they significantly decrease their private donations compared to periods
in which they buy from the computer-seller. Only in treatment Asym-5, we find that
average total donations (private donations by buyers plus the donations via the bundle)
are significantly higher.
Motives other than altruistic preferences have been brought forward to explain why
consumers are on average willing to pay a premium to charity-linked products.9 Elfenbein
et al. (2012) construct a model showing that non-altruistic consumers are willing to pay
a premium for buying from charitable sellers when there exists a given positive relation
between a seller’s altruistic utility and his disutility from behaving opportunistically to-
wards consumers by providing low quality. In that case, consumers’ willingness-to-pay
for the charity-linked product is higher because it provides a credible signal of the seller’s
trustworthiness. Elfenbein and McManus (2010) provide empirical support for the rele-
7The experimental design of Bartling (2015) is different in a number of dimensions. One other differ-
ence is that sellers can decide on which type of product they want to offer for sale.
8In their case, production of the fair product comes at an additional cost of 10, whereas the average
transaction price was 24.2 for the fair product and 19.1 for the unfair product. See Bartling et al. (2015)
for further details.
9Elfenbein and McManus (2010) cite evidence collected by Meyer (1999) that “two-thirds of consumers
report that they would favor retailers or brands associated with a good cause, all else equal.”
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vance of this mechanism. Even if one abstracts from the correlation with product quality,
consumers’ may prefer to buy from sellers that bundle sale transactions with donations
to charity just because they believe these sellers are more deserving. In our experimental
design, we shut down this signalling channel by imposing upon sellers the share of rev-
enues that will be donated to charity. This design feature however cannot preclude that
buyers develop altruistic feelings for charitable sellers and are willing to pay an additional
amount because they wish to reduce the seller’s financial burden. This is a common caveat
in experiments trying to isolate the consequences of warm glow (see e.g. Crumpler and
Grossman, 2008).
In its design, our study is related to several experiments on Bertrand competition that
have appeared since Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) (Bruttel, 2009 ; Bigoni et al., 2012;
Apesteguia et al., 2007; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008). Boone et al. (2012) is one of
the few experimental studies on Bertrand markets with asymmetric constant unit cost.
They find that play is in line with the Nash equilibrium prediction of the low cost firm
setting price equal to the second lowest marginal cost.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and introduces
our research hypothesis. Section 3 provides details on the experimental design. Section 4
presents the descriptive statistics of the data and the experimental results. Section 5
provides results on the altruistic preferences of the participants. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
This section develops a simple duopoly model describing profit-maximizing firms’ equi-
librium pricing strategy when consumers have altruistic preferences and one of the firms
sells either a private good or a bundle that combines a private good with a donation to
charity. Given our experimental design, we refer to this seller as the “subject-seller”. The
other seller sells the private good at marginal cost. This seller is referred to as the “com-
puter seller”. First we describe and solve the buyer’s decision problem for given prices.
Then we consider the subject-seller’s problem in the pricing stage. We also show that if
the pricing stage is preceded by a product stage where sellers can simultaneously decide
whether or not to offer a bundle, the unique strong sub-game perfect Nash-equilibrium in
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pure strategies is the one with no firm offering the bundle. Finally, Section 2.4 explores
how sellers offering the bundle can make a profit when buyers have a biased perception
of the amount the seller donates to charity.
2.1 Buyers
Assume that buyers’ utility can be represented by the following utility function that
incorporates altruistic and warm-glow preferences (Andreoni 1990).





In this utility function, x denotes the consumption utility the buyer derives from buying
the private good and p the price paid such that x− p is her net consumption utility from
buying the private good at price p. gS is the amount the agent donates to the charitable
good in a separate transaction. The second component reflects the warm-glow utility
she derives from the act of giving a total amount of gT = gB(pB) + gU : gB(pB) is the
donation through buying the charity-linked bundle at price pB, gU ≥ 0 the amount of a
separate donation. Indeed, we implicitly assume that giving directly and indirectly via
the intermediary of the consumption good are perfect substitutes in terms of warm-glow.
The sum of all donations to the charity is denoted G. The final component represents
how much the agent cares about the charity per se. Individuals with αi = βi = 0 only
care about private consumption; if αi = 0 and βi > 0, the agent is purely altruistic; when
both αi, βi > 0, the agent is impurely altruistic.
A well known implication of this model that the donations of pure altruists are com-
pletely crowded out: if a third party increases her donation, a pure altruist will respond by
reducing her donation by the same amount. Experimental evidence shows great support
for the presence of warm-glow (see Andreoni, 2006, and Crumpler and Grossman (2008)
and the references therein). We do not expect crowding out to drive our results because
in all of our treatments, subjects stay uninformed about the donations by others. Because
of this and for ease of exposition, we abstract from the impact of pure altruistic motives
on donations and set β = 0 in what follows. In our experimental market, buyers make
two choices simultaneously:
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1. The transaction decision: Whether to buy from the subject-seller or from the
computer-seller;
2. The donation decision: Whether to make a separate donation to the charity.
The treatments differ in the nature of the good offered by the subject-seller. In Control,
she sells the private good separately at price pU . In the other treatments (Asym-2,
Asym-5 and Asym-Abs), she sells the bundle of the consumption good combined with
a charitable donation at price pB. An alternative for buyers in all treatments is to buy
the private good from the computer-seller at a price pMC equal to marginal cost; on top
of this, buyers in all treatments have the possibility to make a separate donation to the
charity without any transaction cost.
Donations to charity Individuals who do not buy the bundle will optimally donate an
amount gU∗ = max {α2i /4, 0} to the charity in a separate transaction.10 Individuals who
buy the bundle donate gB(pB) indirectly through their purchase of the bundle. Apart from
that, they will donate gU∗ = max {α2i /4− gB(pB), 0} in a separate transaction to make
up for the difference between their optimal donation and the amount donated through
the bundle.
Transaction decision If pMC < x, individuals will strictly prefer buying from the
computer-seller over buying nothing because only the former action generates positive
utility. We impose this assumption in our experimental design such that buyers only have
to decide whether to buy from the subject-seller or the computer-seller.
If both sellers offer the private good, the buyer will decide as follows:{
buy from the subject-seller if pU ≤ pMC ;
buy from the computer-seller if otherwise.
(2)
That is, the subject-seller will only have positive demand if she sets a price pU that is
equal to or lower than marginal cost.
10This value of gU∗ equates the marginal cost and benefits of increasing one’s donation. Take the
partial derivative of equation (1) w.r.t. gS and solve for gS to obtain this result.
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If instead the subject-seller offers the bundle at price pB, we distinguish between two
cases based on the value of the warm-glow parameter αi. In case of strong warm-glow
(α2i /4 > g
B(pB) > 0), the buyer will append any indirect charitable donation through the
purchase of the bundle with a separate donation of gU∗ = α2i /4 − gB(pB), giving her a
total utility of
UB = x− pB + gB(pB) + 1
4
α2i .
The alternative is to buy the private good from the computer-seller at price pMC and to
donate gU∗ = α2i /4 to charity in a separate transaction, giving utility U
A = x−pMC+α2i /4.
A comparison between UB and UA shows that the buyer will decide as follows:{
buy from the subject-seller if pB − pMC < gB(pB);
buy from the computer-seller if otherwise.
(3)
In this case, the bundle will be bought if and only if the premium pB − pMC is less than
the donation gB made by the seller to the charitable cause. In other words, the seller’s
revenues net of the donation will be less than pMC , generating negative profits.
In case of moderate warm-glow (0 ≤ α2i /4 ≤ gB(pB)), the buyer will not make a
separate donation next to buying the bundle. In this case, her total utility equals the
utility from buying the bundle:
UB = x− pB + αi
√
gB(pB).
The utility UA from buying from the computer-seller is the same as before so the buyer’s
optimal decision in this situation is to:11{
buy from the subject-seller if pB − pMC ≤ αi
√
gB(pB)− α2i /4;
buy from the computer-seller if otherwise.
(4)
Also in this case of moderate warm-glow, buyers will not buy the bundle from the subject-
seller if the premium pB − pMC exceeds the amount gB(pB) the sellers donates to the
charity. This follows from the fact that the right-hand side of the inequality in equation
11We assume that when indifferent between the bundle and the private good, the agent will buy the
bundle. This can be justified by a convenience one-stop shop argument.
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Treatment Condition Price Buy from Donation:
Control pU ≤ pMC S-seller gU∗ = α2/4
otherwise C-seller gU∗ = 0
Asym-2, α2/4 ≤ gB(pB) pB − pMC ≤ α√gB(pB)− α2/4 S-seller gU∗ = 0
Asym-5, otherwise C-seller gU∗ = α2/4
Asym-Abs α2/4 > gB(pB) pB − pMC < gB(pB) S-seller gU∗ = α2/4− gB(pB)
otherwise C-seller gU∗ = α2/4
Table 1: Equilibrium predictions for the transaction and donation decision in different
treatments for altruistic buyers (α ≥ 0).
(4), αi
√
gB(pB)− α2i /4 ≤ gB(pB).12 The maximal value is therefore attained when αi is
set equal to its upper bound 2
√
gB(pB) and equals gB(pB).13
In sum, we have the following result
Result 1. Buyers with altruistic preferences (α > 0) will never buy the bundle if the pre-
mium pB−pMC for the bundle exceeds the indirect donation gB(pB) made to the charitable
cause.
This result implies that without additional assumptions such as super-additivity or altru-
ism towards the seller, offering the bundle is never profit-increasing for a seller. Table 1
summarizes the predicted equilibrium decisions of altruistic buyers in the different treat-
ments.
2.2 Sellers
We now turn to the seller’s decision problem. We focus on the price-setting behavior of
subject-sellers offering either the private good or the charity-linked bundle. A subject-
seller competes in prices with a computer-seller who sells the private good at price pMC .
Throughout we assume that, apart from the possible donation to charity, sellers’ marginal
cost MC of supplying an additional unit is constant and identical. In each period, sellers
compete for the unit demand of a representative consumer with consumption utility x and
12To see this, note that for α2i /4 ≤ gB(pB), αi
√







gB(pB)− αi/2 ≥ 0 for gB(pB) ≥ α2i /4.
13Inserting 2
√
gB for αi in αi
√
gB − α2i /4 gives 2gB − gB = gB .
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warm-glow parameter α. From Result 1 in the previous section we know that as long as
the computer-seller prices at pMC , subject-sellers are never able to reap positive profits.
For this reason, we focus on deriving the subject-seller’s minimally acceptable price in the
different treatment conditions. This willingness-to-accept price pBWTA is the break-even
price that just covers the unit cost including the transfer to the charitable cause.
Note that whether the computer-seller maximizes profits by setting his price at marginal
cost depends on the altruistic preferences of the buyers. When buyers are not altruistic
(α = 0) and thus do not care for the charitable component of the bundle, the computer-
seller can attain positive profits by setting a price a fraction below pBWTA. This holds
more generally: sellers of a unbundled product that compete with a seller of a bundle
can make positive profits in case buyers exhibit moderate warm-glow and the constraint
α2/4 ≤ gB is non-binding. Because the altruistic preferences of sellers are unobserved, our
experimental design forces the computer-seller to offer the unbundled good at marginal
cost. Admittedly, this is a conservative approach since it ensures that the wedge between
the price of the computer-seller and any price p ≥ pBWTA the subject-seller may charge is
sufficiently wide for all buyers to prefer buying from the computer-seller, independent of
their value of α.
2.2.1 The subject-seller offers the private good [Control]
When both the subject-seller and the computer-seller offer the private good, we are in
the classic situation of Bertrand competition with homogenous products. In this case,
the seller’s pWTA equals marginal cost and theory predicts that competition with the
computer-seller will drive the equilibrium price down to marginal cost:
pU = MC; pi = 0.
2.2.2 The subject-seller offers the charity-linked bundle
Suppose the seller offers the bundle at price pB and the computer-seller sets a price
pMC = MC at which buyers can buy the unbundled consumption good. Because of the
donation made to charity, the unit cost of the seller now equals MC + gB(pB), while the
unit cost of the computer-seller is MC. This situation is akin to Bertrand competition
12
Seller 2
private [U] bundle [B]
Seller 1 private good [U] 0,0 gB(pWTA), 0
bundle [B] 0, gB(pWTA) 0,0
Table 2: Game situation and equilibrium payoffs in the product-stage.
with asymmetric cost since buyers can combine buying the private good with a separate
donation to charity to achieve the same outcome as when buying the bundle. Theory
predicts that the price of the bundled good will be driven down to the point where
pB = pBWTA = MC + g
B(pBWTA); pi = 0.
Proportional and lump-sum donations [Asym-2, Asym-5, Asym-Abs]
When the donation takes the form of a proportion τ of revenues, the subject-seller’s
willingness-to-accept pBWTA equals
pBWTA = MC + τp
B
WTA ⇒ pBWTA =
MC
1− τ . (5)
When the donation is equal to a lump-sum T , pWTA simply is
pBWTA = MC + T.
2.3 Endogenous bundle choice
When the pricing stage is preceded by a stage in which sellers can simultaneously decide
whether to offer a bundle or a separate consumption good, they face the situation as in
Table 2. In case the sellers offer the same product, none of them is able to make positive
profits in the pricing-stage; in the asymmetric case the seller that offers the unbundled
private good can make positive profits in the pricing stage by setting price a fraction below
pBWTA generating profits of pWTA−MC = gB(pWTA). In sum, the product-stage has three
Nash equilibria, (U, B), (B, U) and (B, B) but only the latter is a strong equilibrium.
2.4 Biased perception of charitable donation
As has become clear in the previous subsections, offering the bundle is never profit-
increasing unless one makes additional assumptions about how bundling the consumption
13
and charitable good increases demand. Frackenpohl and Po¨nitzsch (2013) propose that
bundling a physical consumption good (a mug) with a charitable good increases subjects’
willingness to pay. This amounts to xB > xS in the utility function of equation (1). Their
evidence shows that subjects are indeed willing to pay more for the bundle than for the
two goods separately, but the increase is not sufficient to make bundling profit-increasing
for the seller.14
Our objective is to explore whether offering bundles can be profit-improving if con-
sumers have a biased perception of the part of revenues that is transferred to charity.
We hypothesize that the likelihood of such a perception bias is higher when the amount
of revenues given to charity is not presented as a fixed sum but as a fixed fraction of
revenues. In these cases, the relation to the price paid and the donation is less straight-
forward. This leaves buyers more freedom to misperceive their contribution to charity and
we expect that this leads agents to overestimate their actual donation, thereby increasing
their willingness-to-pay for the bundle.
Let gˆT (gU , gB) denote a buyer’s perceived total contribution to charity. We assume
that the perceived contribution is additively separable in the part of the donation made via
the bundle and the part that is donated in a separate transaction. Moreover, we assume
that the separate donation is perceived without bias such that gˆT (gU , gB) = gU + gˆB.
Assume that the bias function gˆB = f(gB) has the following properties: f(0) = 0, f(gB) >
gB for gB > 0 f ′(gB) > 0 and limgB→∞ f(gB) = gB. That is, a bias only happens when
the donation via the bundle is positive, the perceived contribution is strictly increasing
in the actual donation, and the bias disappears in the limit.
The upwardly biased estimate of the donation increases the utility from buying the
bundle for all individuals with α > 0. Moreover, due to the bias less individuals will
make a private donation next to buying the bundle: at a given price pB, only buyers with
α > αˆ = 2
√
gˆB(pB) will make such a donation next to buying the bundle. These buyers
will buy the bundle instead of the private good if and only if pB − pMC ≤ gˆB(pB). This
implies that the seller of the bundle will receive positive demand and can make positive
profits if she sets pB = pMC + gˆB(pB) and the bias is such that gˆB(pB) − gB(pB) > 0.
14When a donation of e 2 is made to charity, willingness to pay for the private good increases from
e 0.67 to e 1.38 (Frackenpohl and Po¨nitzsch 2013) (p. 13).
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Profitable sales are also possible to buyers with α ≤ αˆ. These buyers will prefer the
charity-linked bundle to the private good if and only if pB − pMC ≤ α√gˆB(pB) − α2/4.
Setting the price of the bundle at pB = pMC +α
√
gˆB(pB)−α2/4 will therefore just induce
buyers to buy. This generates positive profits if the gross margin α
√
gˆB(pB) − α2/4
exceeds the donation gB(pB) to be made to the charity. Equating the two expressions
and solving for α shows that this holds true for α ∈ [αˆ − 2√gˆB(pB)− gB(pB), αˆ]. The
important thing to notice here is that the lower bound is negatively dependent on the
wedge between the perceived and the actual donation. In other words, if the divergence
between the actual donation made by the seller of the bundle and the buyer’s belief about
this donation is sufficiently wide, the seller can profitably sell the bundle even to buyers
with moderate altruistic preferences.
In sum, we arrive at the following research hypothesis.
Hypothesis Selling the bundle is expected to create opportunities to generate positive
profits net of the donation to charity. Net profits are expected to be larger when the
donation is framed as a percentage rather than as a fixed amount, and when the percentage
donated is smaller:
piASYM−2 > piASYM−5 > piASYM−ABS > piCONTROL = 0,
with pi denoting the mean profits of the subject-seller net of the donation to charity.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Design
In each ‘market’ one buyer is matched with two sellers, one subject-seller and one computer-
seller. As in Abrams et al. (2000), the buyer’s valuation for the private good is common
knowledge. Buyers do not know the marginal cost of supplying a unit of the private good,
but it is common knowledge that – apart from the donation to charity – these unit costs
are constant across periods. In all treatments, this cost is set at 8 per unit provided.15
15The unit cost is set at a strictly positive level to ensure that in equilibrium, the total cost of providing
a unit will be strictly higher for charitable sellers.
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Whether or not part of the price goes to charity is exogenously determined in order
to prevent sellers using the charity as a signalling device to receive higher prices. The
percentage donated to charity and the fact that this percentage is imposed is known
to buyers. The charity selected for this experiment is the Red Cross, because it is an
internationally renowned charity with the mission to protect human life and health. A
letter signed by the Red Cross was provided to participants as part of the instructions to
increase the credibility that any donations by the participant will be transferred to the
Red Cross.
The subject-seller’s task is to set a price between zero and an imposed maximum (15)
with increments of 0.01 ECU. The computer-seller will set a price equal to the marginal
cost of the subject-seller in all periods. In the control condition, both types of sellers sell
the private product and they do not donate to the Red Rross. In the treatment conditions,
the subject-seller offers the bundle consisting of the private product and a donation to
charity, while the computer-seller does not donate to charity. This difference between the
sellers in the treatment conditions is known to buyers. Buyers will also be notified which
seller is the subject-seller and which one is the computer-seller. Comparing the control
and the treatment conditions enables us to detect the effect of tying the sale of a product
with a donation to charity.
After the sellers have set their prices, the buyer’s decision task in each period is twofold:
• Transaction decision: Whether to buy from the subject-seller or the computer-seller.
• Donation decision: Buyers can make a separate donation to the Red Cross.
In each period, buyers receive an endowment of fifteen ECU, which is the maximum they
can spend in total on the purchase of the product and on the donation. Buyers have
unit demand. In each period, after making the buying decision, buyers can decide on a
private donation to the Red Cross by typing in the amount they would like to donate.
This donation is on top of potential indirect donations via purchasing the bundle. The
transaction costs of the private donation to the Red Cross can be regarded as (close to)
zero, because the effort buyers need to make in order to make this donation is minimal.
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Any private donations are transferred to the Red Cross by the experimenters immediately
after the experiment has ended.
Buyers do not observe the transaction and donation decisions of other buyers, which
effectively rules out social-signaling incentive for altruism and also precludes the possibility
that donations by other subjects will lead to crowding out. Another channel that could
play a role in the crowding out of private donations is the self-signaling motive. However,
Dube´ et al. (2015) do not find evidence that self-signaling plays a role in case the charity-
linked bundle is offered without a price discount. Lastly, by including the opportunity for
buyers to make a private donation, we are able to study the crowding out effect of offering
bundles. Overestimation of the amount donated via the bundle can lead to higher profits
for the firm, but total donations to the charity may decrease if the increase in the actual
amount donated via the bundle is less than the decrease in private donations. Our design
enables us to test this crowding out effect.
The payoffs of the buyers and the sellers depend on the purchasing decision of the
buyer. If the buyer buys from the subject-seller, the payoffs are as follows:
• Buyer’s payoff: Total surplus gained from the transaction minus potential donations
to the Red Cross (15 minus the price paid and the donation).
• Seller’s payoff: Price received minus marginal cost and private donations to the Red
Cross.
If, instead, the buyer buys from the computer-seller, the payoff for the buyer is the same
as when she buys from the subject-seller, but the subject-seller’s payoff is zero.
3.2 Treatments
The following treatments were run: Control, Asym-2, Asym-5, and Asym-Abs. Table
3 shows the parameter choices of the experiment and the equilibrium predictions of the
experimental design. All prices stated are multiples of 0.01 ECU. The table shows the
characteristics of the buyers and the subject-sellers for each treatment. The marginal
costs (MC) for the sellers are set at 8 in each treatment. The donations (a fraction τ and
a lump-sum T ) differ per treatment: the seller does not donate to charity (Control),
17
the seller donates two percent of the price received (Asym-2), five percent of the price
(Asym-5), or a fixed sum of 0.43 ECU (Asym-Abs). The buyer’s maximum amount to
spend in each period (x ) is fifteen ECU for each treatment.
Table 3: Parameter choices and equilibrium predictions. (Prices in ECU).
Treatment Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Asym-Abs
Seller characteristics
MC 8 8 8 8
τ – 0.02 0.05 –
T – – – 0.43
Buyer characteristics
x 15 15 15 15
Equilibrium predictions
pS 8 – – –
pB - 8.17 8.43 8.43
piS 0 – – –
piB – 0 0 0
The equilibrium prediction is that sellers are not able to make profits in any of the
treatments. In Control, competition with the computer-seller will drive the price of
the separate product (pS) to marginal cost such that no profits (piS) are earned. In the
treatments where the subject-seller needs to donate part of the price received to the Red
Cross, we expect buyers to increase their willingness to pay for the bundle (pB). However,
this increase should not exceed the donation such that profits of selling the bundle (piB)
will be zero.
3.3 Implementation
In June, September and October 2015, the study was run with treatments Control,
Asym-2, Asym-5 and Asym-Abs in the GrEELab of the University of Groningen. Two
sessions each consisting of fifteen trading periods were scheduled for each treatment,
except for Control, which was run with three sessions. As Table 4 shows, a total of 102
participants participated in our experiment. On average, participants were 22.35 years
old and 59 percent was female (see Table 5).16 There are no significant differences in the
16In Asym-Abs and in Control, one participant did not provide information regarding age and
gender, and in Asym-2, one participant did not provide information regarding gender. These participants
were subsequently excluded from the summary statistics.
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gender proportions of buyers and sellers between treatments. The average age of buyers in
Asym-Abs (p=0.048) and of sellers in Asym-5 (p=0.049) is somewhat higher compared
to Control.17
Table 4: Summary of the treatments.
Treatment Name Donation to charity Nr. rounds Nr. participants
I Control 0 15 28
II Asym-2 2% 15 30
III Asym-5 5% 15 24
IV Asym-Abs 0.43 ECU 15 20
Total 60 102
Table 5: Summary statistics subjects.
Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Asym-Abs
Female (in %)
Buyers 85.71 53.33 66.67 60.00
Observations 14 15 12 10
Sellers 61.54 42.86 33.33 66.67
Observations 13 14 12 9
Age (in years)
Buyers 22.07 22.07 22.17 23.70∗∗
(1.64) (2.55) (3.30) (2.95)
Obervations 14 15 12 10
Sellers 21.92 21.67 23.83∗∗ 21.78
(2.29) (2.82) (3.21) (1.20)
Observations 13 15 12 9
Values in percentages or in years over the observations in the respective treat-
ment. Standard deviations in parentheses. ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically sig-
nificant differences at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were placed in cubicles and randomly allocated the
role of buyer or seller of the product. They kept this role for the entire experiment. The
experiment started after participants had carefully read the instructions and correctly an-
swered the control questions. In each of the fifteen trading periods, participants assigned
the role of seller had to indicate their pricing decision, while participants assigned the role
of buyer had to indicate their buying and donation decisions. The conversion rate was
set at: 1 ECU=e 2.
17We use t-tests to compare all means, unless otherwise noted.
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After the participants finished the fifteen trading rounds they played a one-shot dic-
tator game to elicit altruistic preferences.18 To obtain a more complete picture of the
charitable behavior of participants and their altruistic preferences, subjects were asked
to fill in a questionnaire after the dictator game. Participants were asked about their
charitable behavior (how many charities and the Red Cross specifically they donate to
on an annual basis; how they would rank the Red Cross in terms of reputation and how
much the Red Cross deserves their donation).
Participants were paid out one random period in the market game and their allocations
of the dictator game. Any donations made to the Red Cross on behalf of the participants
in the selected payment period were transferred to the Red Cross by the experimenters
immediately after the experiment finished.
4 Experimental results
4.1 Market prices
First we consider market prices. Figure 1 presents for each treatment the average market
price for each of the 15 periods. By and large, average prices are above 8, except for
some markets in the first few and final periods where some subject-sellers price (and sell)
considerably below marginal cost.19 Note that rational agents can simply avoid losing
money by never pricing below marginal cost. We suspect that sellers in the experiment
sometimes price below cost because of the experimental feature that they compete with
a computer-seller selling at marginal cost. This makes it hard for subject-sellers to sell.
They then occasionally price below cost to find out whether they are at least able to sell
at below-cost prices and/or because they are just eager to be part of a transaction. To
abstract from this, we also present the analysis for the subset of observations where the
price paid at least equals marginal cost in what follows.
Table 6 shows the average market prices of the subject-seller.20 We observe that the
18We are aware of the limitations of using the dictator game to measure altruism, e.g. behavior
in dictator games is found to be confounded by experimenter demand effects (Davis and Holt 1992).
However, we use it as a relative measure of the degree of altruism of the participants.
19In total, 68 out of the 240 transactions by subject-sellers are at a price below marginal cost. For
Control 15/60 (= 25%); Asym-2, 19/73 (26%); Asym-2, 20/68 (29%) and Asym-2, 14/39 (36%).
20Table A.1 provides more elaborate descriptive statistics.
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Figure 1: Per-period average market prices (in ECU).
average market price (as a mean of the average market price per subject-seller) shown in
column (1) is lowest in Control, but not significantly lower than marginal cost (p =
0.282, two-sided t-test). Compared to Control, the average market price is significantly
higher in Asym-Abs (p = 0.035, one-sided t-test)21. This implies that buyers increase
their willingness to pay for the private product if it is combined with a fixed-amount
donation.22 After controlling for below marginal cost pricing, we find that average
market prices are significantly higher both in Asym-5 and in Asym-Abs (p = 0.002 and
0.009, respectively, one-sided t-tests). Hence, sellers are able to obtain a higher price if
they offer the product in combination with a donation of five percent or a fixed amount
of 0.43 ECU.
4.2 Profits
Table 7 shows per treatment the subject-sellers’ average profits net of the donation. We
observe from column (1) that across all periods and including all sales, only average
profits in Asym-2 are significantly positive at the 10%-level. We report for all between-
21Due to differences in marginal cost between treatments, we report p-values from one-sided t-tests,
except for the comparison between Asym-5 and Asym-Abs, for which we perform a two-sided t-test.
22For Asym-2 a significant effect is found at the 10%-level.
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Table 6: Average payments to the subject-seller (in ECU).
All Difference p ≥ MC Difference
Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Control Asym-2 Asym-5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control 7.18 8.58
Asym-2 8.44 1.26∗ 8.63 0.05
Asym-5 8.43 1.24 –0.01 9.82 1.24∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗
Asym-Abs 9.29 2.11∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.87 9.87 1.28∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.04
Notes. Cells give mean values (in ECU). (1) denotes the average price paid by the buyer to the subject-seller
(including periods without sales). (2) − (4) show the difference in the average price paid. (5) denotes the
average price paid conditional on buying at a price at least equal to marginal cost. (6) − (8) shows the
difference between treatments in the average price given in (5). ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically significant
differences at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level). p-values based on one-sided t-tests, except for comparison
between Asym-5 and Asym-Abs.
Table 7: Average profits (in ECU).
All Difference p ≥ MC Difference
Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Control Asym-2 Asym-5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control –0.06 0.58∗∗
Asym-2 0.10∗ 0.16 0.46∗∗∗ –0.13
Asym-5 –0.01 –0.05 –0.11 1.33∗∗∗ 0.75∗ 0.87∗∗∗
Asym-Abs 0.27 0.33 0.18 0.28 1.44∗∗ 0.85∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.11
Notes. Cells give mean values (in ECU). (1) denotes the average profits of the subject-seller (including periods
without sales). (2)− (4) show the difference in the average profits. (5) denotes the average profits conditional
on receiving a price at least equal to marginal cost. (6)− (8) shows the difference between treatments in the
average profits given in (5). ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%-level (5%-level,
10%-level). p-values based on two-sided t-tests.
22
treatment comparisons of profits p-values based on two-sided t-tests. None of these is
significant.
The picture changes when we focus on sales that make non-negative contributions to
profit. Columns (5)-(8) show that in this case, sellers in all treatments attain significantly
positive profits and that, compared to the control group, sellers in Asym-5 and Asym-
Abs significantly benefit (at the 10%-level) from bundling their product with a charitable
donation, with average profits of 1.33 and 1.44 ECU profit per transaction, respectively.
For Asym-2 we do not find such an effect.23 Hence, compared to selling only the private
product, offering the bundle seems profitable when donating five percent of the sales price
or an equivalent absolute amount. The reason for the difference between columns (1) and
(5) is that mean profits reported in column (1) are, especially for Asym-5, distorted by
some negative outliers, see Figure 2.
The reason for why bundling is profit-increasing in Asym-5 and Asym-Abs is that
sellers set higher prices and that a fraction of buyers is willing to buy at prices above cost.
In Control, buyers on average complete 29% of all transactions with subject-sellers,
but when the subject-seller sets a price above cost, this results on average only in 17% of
all cases in a successful transaction. With 19%, the success-rate is comparable in Asym-
Abs, despite the on average higher ask-prices. The combination of a high ask price and
a success-rate of 27% explains the profitability of Asym-5.24
4.3 Crowding out
So far we considered the impact of bundling on sellers’ propensity to create positive price-
cost margins. This subsection redirects attention to the implications for charity revenues.
Do donations via the bundle increase charitable donations or do they crowd out private
donations by buyers?
Table 8 lists the treatment average of total donations, i.e. the sum of private donations
and donations via the bundle and provides the first part of the answer. The first column
shows that average total donations are significantly higher than zero in all treatments.
23Pairwise nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests lead to slightly different results with p = 0.020 and
p = 0.111 for the comparison of Asym-5 and Asym-Abs with the control group, respectively.
24In Asym-2, also 27% of all ask-price above cost lead to a transaction. However, subject-sellers in
this treatment set on average narrow price-cost margins such that profits are significant but small.
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Figure 2: Average profits in ECU per treatment, subject-level.
Average donations are higher in all treatments in which the bundle is offered but only
significantly so in Asym-5. In that treatment, average total donations are more than
twice the amount in Control. As becomes clear when we split total donations into its
two constituent parts, the private donation and the donation via the bundle (Table A.2),
it becomes clear that the difference between Control and Asym-5 is driven by the
bundle donations (they account for 0.16 ECU or 20% of the total increase) as well as
by higher private donations in Asym-5 (1.35 vs. 0.69 ECU on average, including zero
donations). This at least suggests that donating via the bundle in this treatment does
not crowd out private donations.
Column 5 of Table 8 focuses on the level of donations conditional on buyers donating
either in private or via the bundle. The main take away is that, conditional on donating,
the total donations are higher in Asym-5 than in any of the other two bundle treatments
Asym-2 (p = 0.088) and Asym-Abs (p = 0.073) but not higher than in Control. This
difference between Asym-5 and Asym-Abs is the more remarkable given that donations
via the bundle are the same in both treatments (ECU 0.42 vs. 0.43, respectively).
To further investigate possible crowding out, Table 9 splits the transactions into two sets
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Table 8: Total Donations (in ECU).
All Difference TD > 0 Difference
Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Control Asym-2 Asym-5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control 0.69∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
Asym-2 0.78∗∗∗ 0.09 0.99∗∗∗ –0.54
Asym-5 1.50∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.72∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 0.18 0.73∗
Asym-Abs 0.77∗∗∗ 0.08 –0.01 –0.73∗ 0.95∗∗∗ –0.58∗∗ –0.04 –0.77∗
Notes. Cells give mean values (in ECU). Total donations in (1) denote the sum of private donations and
donations via the bundle. Column (1) includes zero-donations, column (5) only includes positive total donations.
Columns (2) − (4) and (5) − (8) present the respective differences in average donations between treatments.
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level). p-values based on
two-sided t-tests, except for comparison with zero-donations in (1) and (5) (one-sided t-test).
Table 9: Private Donations (in ECU).
Subject Difference Computer Difference
Seller Seller
Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Control Asym-2 Asym-5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control 0.76∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
Asym-2 0.34∗∗ –0.43 1.16∗∗∗ 0.47
Asym-5 1.15∗∗∗ 0.38 0.81∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 0.63 0.16
Asym-Abs 0.40∗∗ –0.37 0.06 –0.75 0.93∗∗∗ 0.24 –0.23 –0.39
Notes. Cells give mean values (in ECU). Donations in (1) are the buyers’ average private donations conditional on
buying from the subject-seller; (5) idem, conditional on buying from computer-seller. Columns (2)− (4) and (5)− (8)
present the respective differences in average donations between treatments. ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indicate statistically significant
differences at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level). p-values based on two-sided t-tests, except for comparison with
zero-donations in (1) and (5) (one-sided t-test).
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based on whether the transaction was completed with the subject-seller or the computer-
seller. The table shows that for all treatments, average private donations (in ECU)
for both groups are strictly positive with no significant differences between control and
treatment groups. At this point, one might be tempted to use a comparison between
columns (1) and (5) to distill an estimate of treatment-specific crowding out. However,
such an estimate would be biased because it includes individuals who have self-selected
into always buying from either the subject-seller or the computer-seller.25
For this reason, we limit attention to buyers that buy at least once from the subject-
seller and the computer-seller. For each of them, we calculate the difference between
their average private donation when they buy from the subject-seller and when they buy
from the computer-seller. Table 10 presents the results for each treatment. We observe
that for the Control-treatment there is no difference, which suggests that the difference
between the nature of the seller (computer or human subject) does not impact their
donation decision. On the within-subject level, crowding out is almost complete in the
treatments Asym-2 and Asym-Abs. In contrast, crowding out seems absent in Asym-5.
Table 10: Within-Subject Difference Private Donations (subject vs. computer
seller) (in ECU).
Difference
median mean s.e. p-value obs.
Control 0 –0.004 0.054 0.946 14
Asym-2 –0.134 –0.190 0.054 0.005 12
Asym-5 –0.027 –0.104 0.095 0.294 12
Asym-Abs –0.446 –0.476 0.144 0.016 7
Notes. Cells give mean differences (in ECU). p-values based on
two-sided t-test on mean difference being equal to zero. Unit of
observation: buyers.
One of the patterns observed at the individual level in Asym-Abs is depicted in Figure 3.
This subject by definition donates 0.43 ECU to the charity in periods in which she buys
the bundle. One observes that in those periods, her private donation is mostly zero.
However, in periods in which she does not buy the bundle, she instead makes up for the
25For example, in Asym-2, three out of the fifteen buyers buy in all periods from the computer-seller.
Their average private donations are a relatively high 1.18 ECU, so their presence explains to a great
extent the observed gap between 0.34 and 1.16 for this treatment.
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missed revenue by the charity by making a private donation of exactly 0.43 ECU. This
suggests that at least for some buyers, the announced donation by the subject-seller acts
as a sort of anchor or social norm to which they wish to adhere, even if they do not buy
from the seller.26 We consider this an experimental artefact which is likely to slightly bias
upwards our estimates of crowding out presented in Table 10. In spite of this, we believe
that the bundle does crowd out private donations, although it is somewhat puzzling that
we do not clearly observe this for treatment Asym-5.
Figure 3: Per-period average donations (in ECU).
Note. Private donations and donations via buying the bundle of subject #8002 in treatment Asym-Abs.
4.4 Regression Analysis
Table 11 presents the estimation results of the regression analysis. The dependent variable
in the second column is the price paid by the buyer to the subject-seller, including all
prices paid (‘All’) and excluding all prices paid below marginal cost (‘P ≥ MC’). We
observe that offering charity-linked bundles is only price-increasing if the private product
26The histograms B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B show this type of norm formation only for the absolute
amount treatment Asym-Abs but not for the percentage treatments. For those treatments, the mode is
at 0.50 ECU, as for the control treatment.
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Table 11: Estimation Results
Price Paid Net Profits Total Donations
All P ≥MC All P ≥MC All TD > 0
Constant 11.18∗∗∗ 11.47∗∗∗ 1.76 3.39∗∗∗ 0.12 0.48
(2.71) (0.90) (1.33) (0.89) (0.62) (1.13)
Asym-2 1.31∗ 0.15 0.17 –0.02 0.16 –0.60
(0.73) (0.25) (0.13) (0.25) (0.19) (0.40)
Asym-5 1.60 1.55∗∗∗ 0.23 1.05∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ –0.24
(0.96) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24) (0.41)
Asym-Abs 2.15∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.35 0.90∗ 0.10 –0.64
(0.92) (0.48) (0.24) (0.48) (0.18) (0.39)
Age –0.18 –0.13∗∗∗ –0.08 –0.13∗∗∗ –0.00 0.03
(0.13) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Gender –0.18 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.44∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(0.61) (0.27) (0.17) (0.22) (0.14) (0.21)
N 645 495 720 495 1485 1110
N Clusters 43 33 48 33 99 74
Notes. In the second column, the dependent variable is the price paid by buyers to the subject-
seller. We include all prices paid (subcolumn ‘All’) as well as only the prices paid that are at least
equal to marginal cost (subcolumn ‘P ≥ MC’). In the third column, the dependent variable is
the profits net of the donation to charity. We include all transactions (subcolumn ‘All’) as well as
only the transactions in which the buyer bought from the subject-seller (subcolumn ‘P ≥MC’).
In the last column the dependent variable is the total donations to the charity (bundle donations
via the seller and private donations of the buyer). We include all donations (also zero amounts)
(subcolumn ‘All’) as well as only positive total donations (subcolumn ‘Positive’). In all models,
the independent variables are the treatment variables Asym-2, Asym-5 and Asym-Abs, where
Control is the benchmark, and the control variables are age and gender (1 if female). ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ )
indicate statistically significant differences at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the subject level.
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is coupled with a fixed amount donation. Compared to offering only the private product
(Control) donating an absolute amount increases prices paid by 2.15 ECU, which is an
increase of almost 20 percent. Including only prices that are at least equal to marginal
cost leads to a significant increase in prices by 1.55 ECU in Asym-5 (an increase of 13
percent) and by 1.33 ECU in Asym-Abs (an increase of 11 percent) relative to Control.
Age seems to negatively impact average prices paid.
The dependent variable in the third column is profits of the subject-seller net of the
donation to charity, including periods without transactions with the subject-seller (‘All’)
as well as only periods in which the price paid to the subject-seller was at least equal
to marginal cost (‘P ≥ MC). We observe that none of the donation schemes is able
to increase profits if all periods are included – also those in which no transaction with
the buyer took place. Excluding transactions with the computer-seller and prices paid
below marginal cost leads to significantly higher net profits in Asym-5 and in Asym-Abs.
Hence, compared to selling only the private product, a donation of 5 percent increases
profits by 1.05 ECU (an increase of 30 percent), while an absolute amount donation
increases profits by 0.90 ECU (an increase of 26 percent). Age seems to negatively impact
net profits.
In the last column the dependent variable is total donations to the charity, in which
all donations are included (‘All’) as well as only positive donations (‘TD > 0’). The
five percent donation scheme is able to raise total donations by an amount of 0.50 ECU,
which is more than four times the average total donations raised in Control, when
comparing all total donations (including zero amounts). Hence, crowding out does not
seem to take place, as average total donations in case sellers offer the bundle are not
significantly different from or even significantly higher than when sellers offer only the
private product. In order to maximize donation revenues the charity should opt for the
bundle with the five percent donation scheme.
Including only positive total donations leads to insignificant results (final column).
Gender seems to impact total donations positively, suggesting that females donate on




Conditional on the market price being set at or above marginal cost, we find that the
average market price and average profits are significantly higher when the subject-seller
donates five percent or a fixed part of the sales price received. This in contrast to the
predictions of our theoretical model. One possibility is that buyers in the treatment
conditions are willing to pay a higher price because they are more altruistic than the
buyers in the other treatments.
Table 12: Average allocations by Dictators (in ECU).
Sellers Buyers
All All
Control 2.48 (2.15) 3.57 (1.79)
obs. 14 14
Asym-2 2.30 (2.10) 2.90 (1.79)
obs. 15 15
Asym-5 3.08 (2.24) 3.25 (1.76)
obs. 12 12
Asym-Abs 2.53 (2.53) 2.99 (2.20)
obs. 10 10
Notes. Values are in means (in ECU) and re-
flect the part dictators (buyers or sellers in the
market game) allocated to receivers. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) indi-
cate statistically significant differences at the
1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
To test this, we measured the altruistic preferences of participants by their average al-
locations to the receiver in a one-shot dictator game played after the main experiment.
Table 12 shows these average amounts (in ECU). The average allocation by buyers in
none of the treatment conditions shows a significant difference with Control.27
27We are aware that subject decisions in the dictator game are possibly influenced by the outcomes in
the main experiment because of moral cleansing (Ploner and Regner, 2013). For example, the higher total
donations in Asym-5 might induce less generosity in the subsequent dictator game. However, different
from Ploner and Regner (2013) who show such an effect for previous earnings on subsequent generosity
in a dictator game, subjects in our experiment do not know their earnings (i.e. the round that will be
paid out) at the time they play the dictator game. This is likely to attenuate any possible effect of moral
cleansing.
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5.2 Self-Reported Charitable Behavior
The charitable behavior of the participants was also measured by including a questionnaire
at the end of the experiment. Table 13 summarizes the results for the buyers.
Table 13: Buyer’s charitable behavior.
Control Asym-2 Asym-5 Asym-Abs
Charities supported (in %)
Zero 28.57 33.33 16.67 40.00
One to Two 42.86 46.67 83.33∗ 50.00
Three to Six 28.57 20.00 0.00 10.00
obs. 14 15 12 10
Red Cross (in %) 7.69 14.29 9.09 0.00
obs. 13 14 11 10
Reputation 7.21 8.73∗∗∗ 6.83 8.80∗∗∗
(1.72) (1.10) (2.79) (1.03)
obs. 14 15 12 10
Deserves 6.57 8.13∗ 7.50 8.40∗
(3.74) (1.60) (2.47) (1.78)
obs. 14 15 12 10
Notes. Values are in means (in ECU) or in percentages. ‘Charities supported’ reports on
an annual basis the number of different charitable causes supported by subjects with the role
of buyer in the experiment (in percentages). ‘Red Cross’ indicates the average percentage of
participants that donated to the Red Cross over the last twelve months. ‘Reputation’ gives the
average score given to the Red Cross in terms of Reputation as measured on a scale from 0 (very
bad) to 10 (excellent). ‘Deserves’ shows the average score of the Red Cross in terms of deserving
the participant’s donation as measured on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely). ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ )
indicate statistically significant differences with Control at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
The first rows show that in all treatments, the majority of buyers supports at least one
charity a year. In Asym-Abs we observe the highest percentage of buyers who does not
donate to any charity and in Control we find the largest percentage of buyers reporting
to donate to three to six different charities. The differences are however not statistically
significant. The column ‘Red Cross’ shows the percentage of buyers that made a donation
to the Red Cross in the past twelve months. No significant differences between treatments
are observed.
Buyers in Asym-2 and in Asym-Abs score the reputation of the Red Cross signifi-
cantly higher than buyers in the other treatments. However, different from the question
on actual donations to the Red Cross in the past twelve months, these estimates may be
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tainted by buyers’ experiences in the main experiment as it may reflect buyers’ ex post
rationalization of paying higher prices paid for the charity-linked products in the exper-
iment. The same caveat holds for the numbers on the Red Cross deserving a donation,
which are also significantly higher (at the 10%-level) in Asym-2 and in Asym-Abs. In
sum, we cannot fully rule out that the higher prices paid in Asym-2 and Asym-Abs are
to some extent the result of buyers in those treatments having a more favorable opinion
of the Red Cross, however, especially for Asym-Abs, buyers actions in terms of actual
donations to the Red Cross do not match their stated opinions.
6 Discussion and conclusions
From a theoretical perspective, given rational agents, complete markets, and absent trans-
action cost, selling charity-linked bundles should not be profitable even when consumers
are altruistic. In contrast, our experimental findings indicate that charity-linked bundles
have the potential to increase firm profits when the amount the firm promises to donate is
5% of gross revenues or an equivalent fixed amount. When the amount donated is only 2%
of gross revenues the effect on the WTP does not exceed the seller’s additional cost of the
donation. This counters our hypothesis that one possible reason for why charity-linked
bundles may work is that people tend to overestimate the amount donated to charity,
especially for small percentage donations. Instead, it seems that donations need to be of
a certain size in order for buyers to experience affect for the bundle, i.e. “the sense (not
necessarily conscious) that something is good or bad” (Slovic, 2007).
Our experiments leave a number of questions open for future research. First, whereas
5% or 0.43 ECU donations prove most effective in raising profits in our experimental
setting, these numbers may be different for consumption goods whose base-price differs
from the one considered in this experiment. It may be that for expensive items such as
cars a percentage of 1% has the same effect on net profits as the 5% in our experiment.
Second, we tested only a limited number of specifications. A percentage of 10% may
outperform the Asym-5 treatment reported in this paper, although this is not very likely
given the evidence in Elfenbein and McManus (2010). We believe that in particular
treatments that leave buyers ambiguous about the fraction donated to charity deserve
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to be studied. Ambiguity gives buyers the opportunity to adopt a overly optimistic
view of the donation they make via the bundle. Previous studies have shown that such
self-serving interpretations induced by ambiguity leads to less generous choices in dictator
games Haisley and Weber (2010) which suggests that ambiguous schemes are less effective
in raising WTP for the bundle than percentage schemes or absolute amounts.
To conclude, our experiments provide rather firm evidence that offering charity-linked
bundles may be an effective strategic tool for firms to increase profits via an increase
in the willingness-to-pay for the bundle that exceeds the donation. Our findings also
show that this leads to considerable crowding out of private donations. Total donations
to charity are higher in Asym-5 but this is mainly driven by higher average donations
by subjects who buy from the computer-seller. At the same time, the question for the
behavioral mechanism behind the effectiveness of particular schemes by and large remains
unanswered. To answer that question, further research along the lines described above is
needed.
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A Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive market statistics (in ECU).
Price Market Price Profits
All p ≥MC All p ≥MC All p ≥MC
Control median 8.94 9.48 8.00 8.14 0.00 0.14
mean 9.31 (1.39) 9.61 (1.27) 7.18 (2.72) 8.58 (0.84) –0.06 (0.47) 0.58 (0.84)
obs. 14 14 14 12 14 12
Asym-2 median 9.29 9.30 8.32 8.45 0.01 0.28
mean 9.50 (1.50) 9.65 (1.42) 8.44 (0.57) 8.63 (0.42) 0.10 (0.20) 0.46 (0.41)
obs. 15 15 12 10 15 10
Asym-5 median 9.67 10.40 9.32 9.49 0.29 1.02
mean 9.57 (1.48) 10.46 (1.00) 8.43 (2.33) 9.82 (0.79) –0.01 (1.21) 1.33 (0.75)
obs. 12 12 12 8 12 8
Asym-Abs median 9.84 9.84 9.24 10.03 0.00 1.60
mean 9.90 (1.35) 10.14 (1.10) 9.29 (1.33) 9.87 (1.10) 0.27 (0.59) 1.44 (1.10)
obs. 10 10 7 5 10 5
Notes. Cells give mean values (in ECU). Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the subject-
seller. The columns labeled ‘All’ show mean value over all periods, the columns labeled ‘p ≥MC’ only include the subset
of periods in which the subject-seller set a price equal to or above marginal cost. ‘Price’ shows the mean price set by
subject-sellers; ‘Market price’ refers to the average price conditional on the buyer buying from the subject-seller; ‘Profits’
shows the average profits net of the donation to charity; ‘obs.’ refers to the number of observations.
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics donations (in ECU).
Total Donations Bundle Donations Private Donations
All TD > 0 All BD > 0 All PD > 0
Control median 0.28 1.23 – – 0.28 1.23
mean 0.69 (0.92) 1.53 (1.18) – – 0.69 (0.92) 1.53 (1.18)
obs. 14 10 14 10
Asym-2 median 0.43 0.65 0.05 0.17 0.34 1.00
mean 0.78 (0.88) 0.99 (1.06) 0.05 (0.05) 0.17 (0.01) 0.73 (0.88) 1.16 (1.05)
obs. 15 13 15 12 15 14
Asym-5 median 1.27 1.33 0.14 0.47 1.16 1.54
mean 1.50 (1.08) 1.72 (1.06) 0.16 (0.10) 0.42 (0.12) 1.35 (1.05) 1.87 (0.93)
obs. 12 11 12 12 12 11
Asym-Abs median 0.54 0.62 0.11 0.43 0.44 0.59
mean 0.77 (0.71) 0.95 (0.69) 0.11 (0.10) 0.43 (0.00) 0.66 (0.65) 1.09 (0.99)
obs. 10 9 10 7 10 9
Notes. Cells give mean values (in ECU). Standard deviations are in parentheses. The unit of observation is the buyer.
The columns labeled ‘All’ show mean value over all periods, the columns labeled ‘BD > 0’, ‘PD > 0’ and ‘TD > 0’ only
include the subset of periods with positive donations of the category considered. ‘Bundle Donations’ shows the donations
by sellers via the bundle. By design, no bundles are sold in Control. ‘Private Donations’ refers to the donations by
buyers via a separate transaction. ’Total Donations’ is the sum of donations via the bundle and private donations. By
design, Control includes only private donations. ‘obs.’ refers to the number of observations.
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B Social norm formation
Figure B.1: Histogram private donations conditional on NOT buying the bun-
dle.
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